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The Alaska Supreme Court chartered new territory in the contro-
versy over the legal recognition of same-sex relationships in Alaska 
Civil Liberties Union ex rel. Carter v. Alaska.  By striking down 
provisions that limit state and municipal employee benefits to the 
spouses of employees, the court extended the state constitution’s 
equal protection clause to include non-discrimination of same-sex 
couples under the shadow of a state marriage amendment that con-
stitutionally defines marriage as an institution exclusively limited to 
one man and one woman.  This Comment examines the decision of 
the Alaska Supreme Court and, despite reservations for elements of 
the court’s rationale, suggests that the decision may serve as a model 
for at least temporary reconciliation between state marriage amend-
ments and the need for equal protection for same-sex couples in 
other states. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Within the last decade, the legal status of gays and lesbians has 
moved in conflicting, if not seemingly chaotic fashion in the United 
States.  In 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ordered the 
State to make provisions for same-sex marriage, thereby granting 
same-sex couples complete equality with opposite-sex couples.1  In 
contrast, eighteen states have amended their constitutions since the 
mid-1990s, including thirteen states in 2004, to explicitly limit mar-
riage between one man and one woman.2  The opposite directions 
in which states have moved in respect to the legal recognition of 
same-sex couples may reflect the perceived deep social divisiveness 
that exists in contemporary American culture concerning gay and 
lesbian rights.3  Indeed, the differing state approaches can be 
framed as a prime example of states serving as laboratories in new 
social experiments4 and, in this case, social experiments in the 
forms of families and human relationships. 
While such state-by-state experiments offer a competitive 
means of finding effective solutions to complex legal and political 
problems, widely varying approaches on questions concerning fun-
damental rights or the essential dignity of individuals may leave 
some people in the nation far worse off than others in significant 
ways.  Fortunately, judicial review exists to identify fundamental 
 
 1. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 2. States that have amended their constitutions to define marriage as be-
tween one man and one woman are: Nebraska (2000), Nevada (2002), and Oregon 
(2004).  States that have amended their constitutions to define marriage as be-
tween one man and one woman and have passed statutes to define marriage for 
the same purpose are: Alaska (1998/1996), Arkansas (2004/1997), Georgia 
(2004/1996), Kansas (2005/1996), Kentucky (2004/1998), Louisiana (2004/1999), 
Michigan (2004/1996), Mississippi (2004/1997), Missouri (2004/2001), Montana 
(2004/1997), North Dakota (2004/1997), Ohio (2004/2004), Oklahoma (2004/1996), 
Texas (2005/2003), and Utah (2004/1995).  See Human Rights Campaign, “State-
wide Marriage Laws,” http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section= 
Your_Community& ContentID=19449 (last visited Mar. 28, 2006). 
 3. Evan Gerstmann, SAME SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 201–06 
(2004) (describing how the general public is unpredictable in how it will view 
same-sex relationships in the future).  The public’s perception of same-sex rela-
tionships is still divided, and that social acceptance of same-sex marriage may be 
significantly less than legal acceptance of such unions.  Id. 
 4.   See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (extolling 
one of the advantages of federalism: “It is one of the happy incidents of the fed-
eral system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a 
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest 
of the country”) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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rights and protect such rights from majoritarian whims.5  Decisions 
by couples on how to manage their family, marriage, and living ar-
rangements, in particular, are some of the most personal and fun-
damental issues guaranteed by the Constitution, and thus cannot 
be limited by states unless absolutely necessary means are used to 
achieve compelling interests.6  Private, consensual same-sex inti-
macy recently reached similar heights of constitutional protection 
in Lawrence v. Texas.7 
A disconnect, consequently, has developed between a federal 
constitutional recognition of sexuality-related privacy and the surge 
in state constitutional amendments that explicitly refuse to recog-
nize the sanctity and legal claims of same-sex couples.  On October 
28, 2005, however, the Alaska Supreme Court became the first 
court to bridge the growing gap between legal protection and non-
protection of same-sex couples.8  Alaska Civil Liberties Union ex 
rel. Carter v. Alaska is noteworthy because Alaska has statutory 
and constitutional provisions that define marriage as an institution 
limited to one man and one woman;9 yet, the supreme court held 
that, according to the state constitution, the domestic same-sex 
partners of state and municipal employees were entitled to the 
same employee benefits offered to spouses of state and municipal 
employees.10  Specifically, the court held “spousal limitations to be 
unconstitutional as applied to public employees with same-sex do-
mestic partners.”11  In making such a ruling, the court was able to 
extend legal recognition, or at least equal legal protection, to same-
sex couples in a limited but significant way, and yet remain faithful 
to a jurisprudence that constitutionally denies marriage status to 
same-sex couples.  Because of its breakthrough analysis, rationale, 
and conclusion, Carter may very well serve as a guide for the pur-
 
 5. “Independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar 
manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark 
against every assumption of power in the legislative or executive; they will be 
naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in 
the constitution by the declaration of rights.”  1 ANNALS OF CONG. 457 (Joseph 
Gales ed., 1789) (statement of James Madison). 
 6. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Moore v. E. Cleveland, 
431 U.S. 494 (1977); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 7. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 8. See Alaska Civil Liberties Union ex rel. Carter v. Alaska, 122 P.3d 781 
(Alaska 2005). 
 9. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25; see also ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.05.011, .013 
(2004). 
 10. Carter, 122 P.3d at 794. 
 11. Id. at 783–84. 
04__LOBSINGER.DOC 6/5/2006  4:00 PM 
120 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [23:117 
suit of rights of same-sex couples in the other seventeen states that 
constitutionally limit marriage to one man and one woman. 
II.  HISTORY OF SAME-SEX LITIGATION AND LAW IN ALASKA 
The possibility of extending equal benefits to domestic part-
ners of same-sex public employees was first raised in 1995 by a su-
perior court when policies that limited benefits to spouses of em-
ployees were challenged.12  Relying in part on Alaska’s then 
gender-neutral marriage statute that used the word “person” rather 
than “man” and “woman,”13 the superior court held that the Uni-
versity of Alaska-Fairbanks could not legally limit spousal benefits 
to husbands and wives.14  During the same time, same-sex plaintiffs 
Jay Brause and Gene Dugan brought suit against the Alaska Bu-
reau of Vital Statistics in order to have their application for a mar-
riage license approved, relying on the then gender-neutral marriage 
statute.15 
In sharp reaction to the litigation, the state legislature drafted 
a new marriage statute, which still stands today.  The statute in part 
reads: 
Marriage is a civil contract entered into by one man and one 
woman that requires both a license and solemnization.16 
A marriage entered into by persons of the same sex, either under 
common law or under statute, that is recognized by another state 
or foreign jurisdiction is void in this state, and contractual rights 
granted by virtue of the marriage, including its termination, are 
unenforceable in this state.17 
A same-sex relationship may not be recognized by the state as 
being entitled to the benefits of marriage.18 
 
 12. Tumeo v. Univ. of Alaska, No. 4 FA-94-43, 1995 WL 238359, at *1 (Alaska 
Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 1995). 
 13. The wording of the marriage statute was revised in 1974 from “man” and 
“woman” to “person” and the age of consent was changed to nineteen for both 
men and women, 1974 Alaska Sess. Laws 17, most likely to comply with a 1972 
amendment to Alaska’s constitution that prohibits sex discrimination, ALASKA 
CONST. art. I, § 3. 
 14. Tumeo, 1995 WL 238359, at *7. 
 15. Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743, 
at *1 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998). 
 16. Act of May 7, 1996, ch. 21, § 1(a), 1996 Alaska Sess. Laws 1 (codified at 
ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.011(a) (2004)). 
 17. Act of May 7, 1996, ch. 21, § 2(a), 1996 Alaska Sess. Laws 2 (codified at 
ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.013(a) (2004)). 
 18. Act of May 7, 1996, ch. 21, § 2(b), 1996 Alaska Sess. Laws 2 (codified at 
ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.013(b) (2004)). 
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With the new marriage statute, Brause and Dugan amended 
their complaint to ask for a declaration that the marriage statute 
was unconstitutional.19  The superior court found that under the 
equal protection amendment of Alaska’s constitution,20 choosing 
one’s life partner, regardless of whether the partnership is tradi-
tional or nontraditional, is a fundamental right.21  Moreover, the 
court determined that the prohibition on same-sex marriage was a 
classification based on gender.22  The superior court then ordered a 
trial requiring the State to show a compelling state interest in pro-
hibiting same-sex marriage.23 
Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics ignited a movement for 
amending the state constitution to explicitly define marriage as 
only between one man and one woman.  The supreme court de-
clined the State’s petition for review,24 which spurred the legislature 
to pass the marriage amendment less than three months after 
Brause.25 
As soon as the marriage amendment passed through the legis-
lature, litigation commenced to prevent the measure from being 
 
 19. See Kevin G. Clarkson et al., The Alaska Marriage Amendment: The Peo-
ple’s Choice on the Last Frontier, 16 ALASKA L. REV. 213, 218 n.30 (1999). 
 20. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1 (“This constitution is dedicated to the principles 
that all persons have a natural right to life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and 
the enjoyment of the rewards of their own industry; that all persons are equal and 
entitled to equal rights, opportunities, and protection under the law; and that all 
persons have corresponding obligations to the people and to the State.”). 
 21. Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743, 
at *6 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998) (“However, just as the ‘decision to marry 
and raise a child in a traditional family setting’ is constitutionally protected as a 
fundamental right, so too should the decision to choose one’s life partner and have 
a recognized nontraditional family be constitutionally protected.  It is the decision 
itself that is fundamental, whether the decision results in a traditional choice or 
the nontraditional choice Brause and Dugan seek to have recognized. The same 
constitution protects both.”). 
 22. Id. at *5 (“That this is sex-based classification can readily be demon-
strated: if twins, one male and one female, both wished to marry a woman and 
otherwise met all of the Code’s requirements, only gender prevents the twin sister 
from marrying under the present law.  Sex-based classification can hardly be more 
obvious.”). 
 23. Id. at *6. 
 24. See Clarkson, supra note 19, at 224 n.75. 
 25. Brause was decided on February 27, 1998.  1998 WL 88743.  The marriage 
amendment passed through a final vote in the House on May 11, 1998, see H. 
Journal 3785, 20th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 1998), preceded by passage in the Senate 
on April 16, 1998, see S. Journal 3300, 20th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 1998). 
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placed on the ballot of a state-wide referendum.26  Aware of the 
time table for the referendum, the supreme court granted expe-
dited consideration to the challenge against the marriage amend-
ment, as well as challenges to two other referendum measures.27  
The supreme court decided to permit the measure on the referen-
dum,28 provided that the second sentence of the marriage amend-
ment would be deleted.29  Finally, on November 3, 1998, voters 
were presented with the proposed amendment: “To be valid or 
recognized in this State, a marriage may exist only between one 
man and one woman.”30 
Voters approved the marriage amendment by a rather large 
margin of 68% to 32%.31  By approving the marriage amendment, 
Alaska became the first state to adopt a marriage amendment that 
explicitly limits marriage to just one man and one woman.32 
After approval of the amendment, the Legislature moved for 
the Brause case to be dismissed as moot.33  The arguments by the 
plaintiffs in Brause evolved to challenge the prohibition against 
same-sex couples from receiving the same legal benefits and pro-
tections of married couples.34  The superior court dismissed the case 
for lack of standing.35  The supreme court subsequently reviewed 
the case and affirmed the lower court’s procedural decision,36 but 
not without also providing some interesting analysis that ques-
tioned the merits of the State’s substantive arguments. 
 
 26. See Clarkson, supra note 19, at 236 n.141. 
 27. Bess v. Ulmer, 985 P.2d 979, 982 (Alaska 1999). 
 28. The plaintiffs alleged that the Marriage Amendment amounted to a revi-
sion rather than an amendment, and thus required approval by Convention.  Id. at 
981.  For the court’s discussion, see id. at 982. 
 29. Id. at 988.  The court required the second sentence (“No provision of this 
constitution may be interpreted to require the State to recognize or permit mar-
riage between individuals of the same sex.”) to be deleted because the court was 
concerned that it was verbal surplusage and that it could unintentionally “seri-
ously interfere with important rights” in the future.  Id. 
 30. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25. 
 31. Clarkson, supra note 19, at 244. 
 32. Although it is commonly believed that Hawaii also adopted a constitu-
tional amendment prohibiting marriage for same-sex couples, this is not so—the 
constitutional amendment that was approved on November 3, 1998, in Hawaii 
reads, “The Legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex 
couples.”  HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23. 
 33. Clarkson, supra note 19, at 244 n.203. 
 34. See Brause v. Alaska, 21 P.3d 357, 358 (Alaska 2001). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
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One of the plaintiffs’ claims was that Alaska Statute section 
25.05.013(b), a provision of the new marriage statute, denied them, 
as a same-sex couple, “at least 115 separate rights which are af-
forded to people who are able to marry,” such as “‘the denial of 
health coverage, forms of insurance, equal protection in pension 
and retirement plans, as well as testamentary and property 
rights.’”37  According to the majority opinion, the State defended 
Alaska Statute section 25.05.013(b) as being “purely symbolic,” 
“lacking in ‘independent legal significance.’”38  Additionally, the 
State argued that individual statutes based on marital status, not 
Alaska Statute section 25.05.013(b), actually provide marital bene-
fits, suggesting that each of those statutes are what ought to be 
challenged under a sliding scale test rather than the merely sym-
bolic section 25.05.013(b) provision.39 
Although the court may have reasonably denied the plaintiffs 
standing due to a lack of demonstrated harm, the court analyzed 
the State’s arguments on the merits. This analysis revealed re-
markably shaky ground for the State.  Assuming Alaska Statute 
section 25.05.013(b) is purely symbolic, symbolism seems to be a 
rather weak justification for denying same-sex couples the pur-
ported 115 separate rights which are afforded to people who are 
able to marry. 
Furthermore, in Bess v. Ulmer, the court had struck verbal sur-
plusage from the marriage amendment by eliminating a sentence.40  
The court stated, “Of special concern is the possibility that the sen-
tence in question might be construed at some future time in an un-
intended fashion which could seriously interfere with important 
rights.”41  The plaintiffs in Brause challenged Alaska Statute section 
25.05.013(b) precisely because of the statute’s interference with a 
number of rights.  The State’s questionable defense of Alaska Stat-
ute section 25.05.013(b) on the grounds of symbolism, and the re-
treat behind individual statutes that materialize rights and benefits 
based upon marital status appears to have been a significant con-
cession by the State that its marriage statutes, in spite of the mar-
riage amendment, are not entirely justified in the face of the rights 
demanded by same-sex couples. 
The dissenting opinion in Brause followed the plaintiffs’ ar-
guments further by suggesting that section 25.05.013(b) may be un-
constitutional because it permits disparate treatment between 
 
 37. Id. at 360. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. 985 P.2d 979, 988 (Alaska 1999). 
 41. Id. 
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same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples, not just between mar-
ried and unmarried couples.  Specifically, under section 
25.05.013(b), same-sex couples would never receive benefits that 
are given to unmarried opposite-sex couples.42  The dissent exam-
ined what unmarried opposite-sex domestic partners may be enti-
tled to under the workman’s compensation scheme.43  Section 
25.05.013(b) would bar same-sex partners from receiving those 
same benefits because of the restrictions the statute places on 
same-sex couples as a class, at least when the statute is not read 
narrowly.  However, as the dissent was primarily concerned with 
issues of ripeness and standing, it left the substantive issues only 
partially addressed and not fully conclusive.44 
III.  CARTER V. ALASKA 
A. The Setting of the Case 
Carter followed in 1999, on the heels of Brause.45  In fact, in the 
ripeness arguments raised in Brause, the State identified the even-
tual plaintiffs in Carter as individuals with potentially proper stand-
ing, in contrast to the plaintiffs in Brause.46  Unlike the plaintiffs in 
Brause, the plaintiffs in Carter could easily specify benefits that 
were held back from them and their same-sex domestic partners 
but that were extended to married couples. 
The plaintiffs in Carter were comprised of the Alaska Civil 
Liberties Union and nine same-sex couples, with at least one mem-
ber of each couple being an employee or retired employee of the 
state or the Municipality of Anchorage.47  The plaintiffs’ complaint 
was “that because they are prohibited from marrying each other by 
Alaska Constitution article I, section 25, they are ineligible for the 
employment benefits the defendants provide to married couples, 
resulting in a denial of the individual plaintiffs’ right to equal pro-
 
 42. Brause, 21 P.3d at 363–64 (Bryner, J., dissenting). 
 43. Id. at 364–65 (comparing the benefits claims of same-sex couples and the 
possible required benefits for unmarried opposite-sex couples in Burgess Con-
struction Co. v. Lindley, 504 P.2d 1023 (Alaska 1972)). 
 44. Brause, 21 P.3d at 365–66.  The dissent’s dissatisfaction with the court’s 
failure to address the larger substantive issues is evident.  Id. at 365 (“But in my 
view the court overstates the difficulty of deciding the constitutional question pre-
sented.  There is certainly ample case law from other jurisdictions to guide this 
court’s decision on the merits.”). 
 45. Alaska Civil Liberties Union ex rel. Carter v. Alaska, 122 P.3d 781, 784 
(Alaska 2005). 
 46. See Brause, 21 P.3d at 360. 
 47. Carter, 122 P.3d at 784. 
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tection.”48  The plaintiffs did not challenge the marriage amend-
ment; rather, they challenged the manner by which state and mu-
nicipal employee benefits were restricted to spouses.  Thus, the 
plaintiffs argued that the public employee benefits programs vio-
lated the equal protection guarantee of article I, section 1 of the 
Alaska Constitution.49 
B. The Superior Court 
Since there was no factual disagreement, all parties moved for 
summary judgment in the superior court.  The superior court re-
jected the plaintiffs’ request to apply heightened scrutiny because: 
1) the defendants did not discriminate between same-sex and op-
posite-sex couples, but rather between married and unmarried 
couples, which does not involve a suspect class; and 2) the only 
right at issue involved employee benefits, which is not a fundamen-
tal right.  Consequently, the superior court applied the lowest level 
of scrutiny and deferred to the defendants’ stated interests of cost 
reduction, administrative efficiency, and the promotion of mar-
riage.50  The plaintiffs then appealed to the supreme court. 
C. The Supreme Court 
1. Issue and Holding.  The supreme court took up the case 
and resolved to answer the substantive issue: Is the spousal limita-
tion for the benefits program of public employees a violation of the 
state constitution’s guarantee of “equal rights, opportunities, and 
protection under the law” for same-sex couples?51  The court held 
that the spousal limitation did indeed violate the constitution’s 
equal protection clause.52  As such, the court ordered the parties to 
file supplemental memoranda to address the matter of remedy.53 
2. Difference in Treatment.  To reach its holding, the court 
first examined whether the spousal limitation treated the plaintiffs 
differently from other similarly situated persons.  The superior 
court held that the State’s employee benefits program differenti-
ated between married and unmarried couples, but that all unmar-
ried couples, whether same-sex or opposite-sex, were treated 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. For the court’s presentation of the plaintiffs’ complaint, see id. at 784–85. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 783 (quoting ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1). 
 52. Id. at 783–84. 
 53. Id. 
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equally.  This position is consistent with previous opinions by other 
courts that have addressed the issue.54  In reversing this position, 
however, the supreme court held that the more appropriate com-
parison is between same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples, re-
gardless of their marital status.55  This, the court found, was the 
most appropriate point of comparison for legal analysis because 
opposite-sex couples have the opportunity to enter into marriage, 
and thus become eligible for the spousal employment benefits.56  
Same-sex couples, on the other hand, are absolutely barred from 
marrying because of the marriage amendment.57 
The court cited one case, Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences 
University,58 in framing spousal limitations for public employees as 
discriminatory treatment against same-sex couples.59  The choice in 
citing Tanner is curious because Tanner reasoned that denying em-
ployee benefits to unmarried domestic partners had a “disparate 
impact” on same-sex couples even though the program in question 
was facially neutral.60  Disparate impact claims “involve employ-
ment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of differ-
ent groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than an-
other and cannot be justified by business necessity.”61  Because it 
determined that the spousal limitation for the employee benefits 
program was facially neutral, the court in Tanner concluded that 
discriminatory treatment could only lie in disparate impact.  In 
Carter, the court referred to the Tanner decision and its conclusion 
regarding disparate impact,62 but the court determined that the de-
fendants’ benefits programs were facially discriminatory.63 
Indeed, the court relied on the programs’ facial discrimination 
in order to rebut the defendants’ claim that the spousal limitations 
 
 54. Id. at 787 (citing Beaty v. Truck Ins. Exch., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 593 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1992); Hinman v. Dep’t of Pers. Admin., 213 Cal. Rptr. 410 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1985); Ross v. Denver Dep’t of Health & Hosps., 883 P.2d 516 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1994); and Phillips v. Wisconsin Pers. Comm’n, 482 N.W.2d 121 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1992) as cases in which same-sex couples were included in the category of unmar-
ried couples merely for purposes of determining discrimination). 
 55. Id. at 788. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. 971 P.2d 435, 442–43 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). 
 59. Carter, 122 P.3d at 788. 
 60. 971 P.2d. at 443. 
 61. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52 (2003) (citing Teamsters v. 
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)). 
 62. See Carter, 122 P.3d at 788 n.31. 
 63. Id. at 788–89. 
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lacked discriminatory intent.64  Citing federal precedent and theory 
of constitutional law, the court concluded that “when a law is dis-
criminatory on its face, ‘the question of discriminatory intent is 
subsumed by the determination that the classification established 
by the terms of the challenged law or policy is, itself, discrimina-
tory.’”65 
Framing spousal limitations for employee benefits as facially 
discriminatory is a significant departure from the analysis in Tanner 
and may indicate a new direction by which courts evaluate provi-
sions that disadvantage same-sex couples.  The court appeared to 
be aware of this departure when it contrasted its stance with previ-
ous cases that found a lack of differential treatment between same-
sex couples and unmarried opposite-sex couples in employee bene-
fits cases.66  Although the court never explicitly referred to same-
sex couples as a class, the court willingly accepted the plaintiffs’ ar-
gument that the proper method of measuring equal treatment is 
not simply between married and non-married couples, but between 
same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples.  By rejecting the meas-
urement of equal treatment through classification systems that are 
merely incidental to same-sex couples, the court appears to have 
echoed sentiments expressed by a Vermont court in Baker v. 
State.67  In Baker, the court found gender discrimination to be an 
inadequate method of measuring the treatment of same-sex cou-
ples.  It ultimately compared same-sex couples to opposite-sex 
couples in holding that Vermont must provide equal rights to 
same-sex couples and opposite-sex married couples.68  Similarly, a 
recent Massachusetts decision in Goodridge v. Department of Pub-
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 788 (citing Hamlyn v. Rock Island County Metro. Mass Transit Dist., 
986 F. Supp. 1126, 1133 (C.D. Ill. 1997)).  The court also cited JOHN E. NOWAK & 
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (4th ed. 2004) and Cook v. Babbitt, 
819 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1993).  Id. 
 66. Id. at 787 (citing Beaty v. Truck Ins. Exch., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 593 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1992); Hinman v. Dep’t of Pers. Admin., 213 Cal. Rptr. 410 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1985); Ross v. Denver Dep’t of Health & Hosps., 883 P.2d 516 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1994); and Phillips v. Wisconsin Pers. Comm’n, 482 N.W.2d 121 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1992) as cases in which same-sex couples were included in the category of unmar-
ried couples merely for purposes of determining discrimination). 
 67. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
 68. The Vermont Supreme Court held that statutes limiting marriage to oppo-
site-sex couples were facially neutral and did not constitute gender discrimination.  
Id. at 880.  The court then compared the rights and privileges enjoyed by married 
couples with the lack of legal recognition and protection for similarly situated 
same-sex couples.  Id. at 883–84.  The court then ordered the legislature to make 
provisions for its decision.  Id. at 887. 
04__LOBSINGER.DOC 6/5/2006  4:00 PM 
128 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [23:117 
lic Health69 directly compared the lack of legal protection and rec-
ognition of same-sex couples with that of opposite-sex married cou-
ples, rather than attempting to fit the analysis through gender dis-
crimination or any other means of measuring equal treatment.70 
Thus, the court in Carter appears to have affirmed a trend in 
the relatively new line of cases involving the rights of same-sex 
couples.  Moreover, in explicitly treating spousal limitations on 
employee benefits as facially discriminatory against same-sex cou-
ples, the court may have taken the judiciary’s awareness of the le-
gal needs of same-sex couples to new heights.  The court’s analysis 
is remarkable considering that Alaska has a constitutional provi-
sion that clearly limits marriage to one man and one woman.71  It 
remains a curiosity, however, that the court flirted with the concept 
of disparate impact72 before ultimately concluding that the em-
ployee benefits program was facially discriminatory “disparate 
treatment.”73  This is particularly strange in light of the fact that 
disparate impact theory is an equal protection assessment tool for 
otherwise facially neutral regulations, not for facially discrimina-
tory regulations.74 
3. The Three-Part Sliding Scale.  Once the Carter court con-
cluded that the employee benefits program treated similarly situ-
ated people differently through facial discrimination, it employed a 
three-part sliding scale to determine whether the unequal treat-
ment could withstand constitutional scrutiny.75  The three-part slid-
ing scale examined: 1) the weight of the constitutional interest at 
stake; 2) the government’s purpose in light of the applicable level 
of review required; and 3) the relationship between the stated in-
terests and means to obtain them.76  In addressing the first part, the 
court found that employment benefits are “undeniably economic” 
 
 69. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 70. See id. at 961 n.21 (declining to consider whether sexual orientation is a 
suspect classification).  See also Gerstmann, supra note 3, at 61–63 (critiquing the 
use of gender discrimination in the pursuit of equality for same-sex couples). 
 71. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25. 
 72. Alaska Civil Liberties Union ex rel. Carter v. Alaska, 122 P.3d 781, 788 
n.31 (Alaska 2005) (citing Tanner v. Oregon Health Scis. Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 442–
43, 447 (Or. 1998)). 
 73. Id. at 789. 
 74. For an elaboration of the U.S. Supreme Court’s distinctions between dis-
parate impact and disparate treatment, see Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 
44, 52–53 (2003), and Int’l Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335–36 
n.15 (1977). 
 75. Carter, 122 P.3d at 789–90. 
 76. Id. 
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and thus ought to receive minimum scrutiny.77  Because the court 
held that the program could not survive even minimum scrutiny, it 
did not address the heightened scrutiny arguments.78  Conse-
quently, it is unclear how the court would respond to non-economic 
same-sex issues.  If discriminatory treatment cannot survive mini-
mal scrutiny, though, it is difficult to imagine very many cases in 
which discriminatory treatment between same-sex and opposite-
sex couples could survive heightened scrutiny. 
For the second part of the three-part test, the court examined 
the defendants’ interest in the spousal limitations.  Because the is-
sue was declared an economic matter, the State and Municipality 
were required only to show legitimate interests.79  The defendants 
claimed to have three legitimate interests: 1) cost control, 2) ad-
ministrative efficiency, and 3) promotion of marriage.80  These in-
terests were measured using the third part of the three-part sliding 
scale, under which the connection between the defendants’ interest 
and the means used must be substantially related, not just ration-
ally related.81  By utilizing a level of scrutiny that is more stringent 
than rational basis review, the court applied the higher standards of 
Alaska’s equal protection clause,82 which is similar to the rational 
review “plus” that has been employed in Supreme Court analysis 
for cases involving the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Consti-
tution.83 
The court dealt with the interest of cost control in a rather 
creatively dismissive fashion.  In assessing the defendants’ claim 
that the legislature intended to “limit employee benefits to a small, 
readily ascertainable group of individuals closely connected with 
the employee” for the purpose of cost control,84 the court altered 
the defendants’ argument by suggesting that the defendants actu-
ally intended to save costs by limiting benefits to those in “truly 
close relationships” with employees.85 This virtually made the 
spousal limitation impossibly related, much less substantially re-
lated, to cost control.  The court justified reformulating the State’s 
 
 77. Id. at 790. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 791 n.48 (citing Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 362 (Alaska 1976)).  
See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1; ALASKA CONST. art. XII, § 6. 
 83. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632–36 (1996). 
 84. Carter, 122 P.3d at 790 (quotations omitted). 
 85. Id. at 791. 
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and Municipality’s cost control claim by concluding that cost con-
trol was incompatible with the defendants’ interest in promotion of 
marriage, since promoting marriage would drive up costs for the 
defendants under the spousal limitation scheme.86 
Although the court may be correct in noting that cost control 
and promotion of marriage are logically inconsistent interests, 
there appears to be little reason why the court had to alter the de-
fendants’ position in order to find that cost control fails under the 
third part of the three-part sliding scale.  Surely by providing bene-
fits to same-sex domestic partners of employees, the State and Mu-
nicipality would not be spending significantly more in benefits than 
by limiting the benefits to spouses of employees.  Also, since the 
court identified the substantial connection required under Alaska’s 
equal protection clause, which exceeds that required under simple 
rational review,87 the court could have concluded that the expected 
insignificant increase in spending would not be substantial enough 
to justify discriminatory treatment.  In fact, the court acknowl-
edged that even under its altered argument of cost control, the ex-
clusion of same-sex domestic partners of employees does techni-
cally reduce costs for the State and Municipality, but nonetheless 
fails to be substantially related.88  Undoubtedly, the court could 
have reached the same conclusion without altering the defendants’ 
argument.  Moreover, the court comes across as unfairly lacking a 
sense of balance by rejecting alternative arguments.  The court rec-
ognized logically inconsistent, but alternative arguments presented 
by the plaintiffs,89 so it is unclear why it felt the need to alter the 
logically inconsistent arguments made by the defendants and con-
sequently reduce the defendants’ cost control argument to a far too 
vulnerable straw-man. 
The second interest the defendants claimed was administrative 
efficiency—the desirability of a bright-line distinction between 
those eligible for benefits and those ineligible.90  Although it agreed 
with the State and Municipality that the lack of formal recognition 
of same-sex couples creates difficulties in administrating benefits to 
domestic same-sex partners of employees, the court nonetheless 
held that the means be substantially related to the interests, and 
concluded that the State and Municipality could devise a system to 
administer the benefits.91  The court cited other jurisdictions that 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 791–92. 
 88. Id. at 791. 
 89. See id. at 789–90. 
 90. Id. at 791. 
 91. Id. 791–93. 
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have successfully devised administrative procedures for distributing 
benefits to unmarried domestic same-sex partners in order to 
pragmatically illustrate that governmental agencies can indeed 
treat same-sex partners equal to opposite sex partners and that the 
lack of a bright-line distinction is not insurmountable.92 
The court’s use of examples in which employee benefits have 
been extended to employees’ domestic same-sex partners has a cer-
tain appeal in negating the defendants’ claim that the spousal limi-
tations are substantially related to administrative efficiency.  At the 
end of its discussion of administrative efficiency, however, the 
court added that “administrative difficulties are not an insur-
mountable barrier to providing benefits if our constitution requires 
that they be provided.”93  It is unclear what the court meant to say 
by qualifying its assessment of administrative difficulties with con-
stitutional requirements, particularly since such constitutional re-
quirements—in terms of the administrative efficiency interest—are 
determined by whether the administrative difficulties are an insur-
mountable barrier.  The court’s reasoning seems circular in that it 
essentially holds that the lack of a bright-line distinction is not truly 
an administrative difficulty—and thus not a constitutionally valid 
reason to deny benefits to same-sex partners—if the constitution 
requires providing benefits to same-sex partners.  It is not alto-
gether clear why the court added this circular argument when it 
made a rather empirically persuasive case that administrative effi-
ciency did not necessitate spousal limitations. 
The third interest offered by the defendants for retaining the 
spousal limitations was the promotion of marriage.94  The court 
agreed with the State and Municipality that “the promotion of mar-
riage is at least a legitimate governmental interest.”95  What the 
court did not agree with, however, was the claim made by the de-
fendants that a connection exists between limiting benefits to 
spouses and the promotion of marriage.96  In ruling on what was ar-
guably the defendants’ least persuasive interest, the court held that 
“making benefits available to spouses may well promote marriage; 
denying benefits to the same-sex domestic partners who are abso-
 
 92. The court cited the benefits programs at the University of Alaska, in states 
including California and Washington, and in a number of cities.  Id. 
 93. Id. at 792 (emphasis added). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 793.  In Lawrence v. Texas, Justice O’Connor not only found that 
marriage is a legitimate state interest, but also, interestingly, that “preserving the 
traditional institution of marriage” is a “legitimate state interest.”  539 U.S. 558, 
585 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 96. Carter, 122 P.3d at 793. 
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lutely ineligible to become spouses has no demonstrated relation-
ship to the interest of promoting marriage.”97 
4. Other Matters and Dicta.  Besides the issues raised under 
the three-part sliding scale, the court also addressed a number of 
other matters that were not directly related to the facts of Carter 
but may provide guidance as to how the court views same-sex is-
sues in general.  One of these matters is the signal the court gave 
on how it may treat any future state constitutional amendments 
that attempt to go beyond limiting marriage to one man and one 
woman.98  On the one hand, the court tried to harmonize Alaska’s 
marriage amendment and equal protection clauses by narrowly in-
terpreting the marriage amendment as pertaining to marriage and 
nothing else.99  Nonetheless, the court hinted that a constitutional 
amendment that attempts to exclude same-sex domestic partners 
from employee benefits would likely be found unconstitutional un-
der the U.S. Constitution in light of Romer v. Evans.100  Thus, under 
the guidance of Romer, the court interpreted the marriage amend-
ment narrowly.101  This suggests that the court may be willing, at 
some point, to expand the equal protection clause of the Alaska 
Constitution to require some form of legal recognition and protec-
tion for same-sex relationships short of actual marriage, such as 
those that exist in Vermont.102  A civil union provision that guaran-
 
 97. Id.  The Colorado Supreme Court similarly rejected the claim that reduc-
ing discriminatory practices against homosexuals would undermine opposite-sex 
marriage by turning heterosexuals away from opposite-sex marriages.  Evans v. 
Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1347 (Colo. 1994), aff’d sub nom. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 
620 (1996). 
 98. Carter, 122 P.3d at 786 n.20. 
 99. Id. at 786 (noting that the marriage amendment does not generally exempt 
same-sex couples from the equal protection clause of Alaska’s constitution). 
 100. Id. at 786 n.20 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)). 
 101. Id. at 787. 
 102. The text of Alaska’s marriage amendment is relatively limited in scope 
compared to the text of similar amendments of other states. Compare ALASKA 
CONST. art. I, § 25 (“To be valid or recognized in this State, a marriage may exist 
only between one man and one woman.”) with UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29 (“Mar-
riage consists only of the legal union between a man and a woman.  No other do-
mestic union, however denominated, may be recognized as a marriage or given 
the same or substantially equivalent legal effect.”) and TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32 
(“Marriage in this state shall consist only of the union of one man and one woman. 
This state or a political subdivision of this state may not create or recognize any 
legal status identical or similar to marriage.”).  Nebraska’s broadly worded mar-
riage amendment (“Only marriage between a man and a woman shall be valid or 
recognized in Nebraska.  The uniting of two persons of the same sex in a civil un-
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tees equal legal protection and recognition of same-sex couples 
would not conceptually run afoul of Alaska’s marriage amendment, 
especially in light of the constitutional analysis provided in Carter. 
In spite of the broad potential Carter may have in expanding 
equal rights to same-sex couples, the court stated that its decision 
should not be interpreted so as to require the extension of the same 
rights to polygamous or consanguineous relationships.103  The court 
distinguished same-sex relationships from incestuous relationships 
by noting that incest is prohibited by state statute while homosex-
ual conduct is legal and cannot be criminalized post-Lawrence v. 
Texas.104  Presumably, the court distinguished polygamy from same-
sex relationships on the same grounds,105 even though the court 
never directly explained its different treatment of polygamy from 
same-sex relationships.  Cautioning against interpreting its holding 
to require the extension of equal protection to consanguineous and 
polygamous relationships, the court echoed the same reservations 
expressed in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.106  This de-
sire to distinguish incestuous and polygamous relationships is no 
doubt moved in part by influential members of the legal commu-
nity who fear that recognizing equal protection for same-sex rela-
tionships will necessarily, in principle, lead to the recognition of 
equal protection for other non-traditional relationships.107  Al-
 
ion, domestic partnership, or other similar same-sex relationship shall not be valid 
or recognized in Nebraska,” NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29) was recently struck down by 
a federal district court for violating the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment, 
Equal Protection Clause, and Bill of Attainder Clause. Citizens for Equal Prot., 
Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980, 997, 1005, 1008 (D. Neb. 2005).  Perhaps this 
signals stricter judicial scrutiny over state marriage amendments that go beyond 
limiting marriage to one man and one woman. 
 103. Carter, 177 P.3d at 793 (“Nothing we hold here would require public em-
ployers to extend to members of polygamous or incestuous relationships the em-
ployment benefits they provide to their employees’ spouses.”). 
 104. Id. at 788 n.30 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.450 (2004)); see also Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 105. Polygamy is a Class A misdemeanor (Unlawful Marrying).  ALASKA STAT. 
§ 11.51.140 (2004). 
 106. 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 n.34 (Mass. 2003). 
 107. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (warn-
ing that the striking of a Texas sodomy statute would mean that no other restric-
tions on sexual activity could survive rational basis review); George W. Dent, Jr., 
Traditional Marriage: Still Worth Defending, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 419, 440 (2004) 
(presenting the traditional argument that same-sex relationships ought not to be 
given legal protection because polygamy and incest will then have to be legally 
accepted as well); Samford Levinson, Thinking About Polygamy, 42 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 1049, 1054 (2005) (suggesting grave philosophical difficulties in distinguish-
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though this Comment will not attempt to address the wider issues 
of non-traditional relationships beyond same-sex relationships,108 it 
is curious to note that the courts in both Carter and Goodridge felt 
the need to bring up polygamy and incest,109 even though the facts 
or analysis had nothing to do with polygamy or incest.  It could be 
that the decisions in Carter and Goodridge were fundamentally 
grounded in conservative views on marriage and familial relation-
ships, in spite of the recognition of same-sex couples; or perhaps 
the courts were keen not to frighten the general public by inviting 
all various forms of challenges to marriage-related statutes simul-
taneously. 
A final matter to which the court drew attention, but that was 
not part of the central holding of the case, was the different levels 
of legal expectations the court placed on same-sex couples and 
unmarried opposite-sex couples.110  In referring to a case where a 
loss of consortium claim was brought by an unmarried opposite-sex 
cohabitant, the court emphasized that the denial of the consortium 
claim was reasonable because the opposite-sex cohabitants had the 
opportunity to marry and thus to be eligible for loss of consortium 
claims.111  However, same-sex couples cannot legally marry.  For 
this reason, the rationale supporting the one case example where a 
loss of consortium claim was denied to an individual in an unmar-
ried opposite-sex couple could not be used to deny same-sex cou-
ples financial claims that are owed to them.112 
5. Remedy.  The court invited the parties to provide supple-
mental briefing on the issue of remedies and permitted the dis-
puted program to remain in effect until resolution of the issue.113  In 
this matter, the court suggested that the State and Municipality 
look to other state and local governments, as well as private em-
 
ing claims for equal rights for polygamists from claims for equal rights for same-
sex couples); Brett H. McDonnell, Responses to Lawrence v. Texas: Is Incest 
Next?, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 337, 359 (2004) (criticizing, in sympathy with 
rights for same-sex couples, the lack of support given to efforts to decriminalize 
consensual adult incest). 
 108. For a fairly analytical, but ultimately inconclusive, examination of the legal 
issues surrounding polygamy and incest, see Gerstmann, supra note 3, at 99–111. 
 109. For references in the Carter case, see supra notes 103–04.  See also Good-
ridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 n.34 (Mass. 2003). 
 110. Alaska Civil Liberties Union ex rel. Carter v. Alaska, 112 P.3d 781, 794 
(Alaska 2005). 
 111. Id. (referring to Trombley v. Starr-Wood Cardiac Group, 3 P.3d 916 
(Alaska 2000)). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 795. 
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ployers who offer benefits to domestic same-sex partners of em-
ployees, as useful models for implementing a sufficient benefits 
program.114  The court also cited Goodridge as an example in which 
the legislature was given time to take appropriate action to meet 
the holding of the court.115 
IV.  REFLECTIONS AND APPLICATIONS 
The incredible irony of Carter is that the marriage amendment 
possibly ensured that the court would examine the difference in 
treatment between same-sex and opposite-sex couples, rather than 
between married and unmarried ones.  Without the marriage 
amendment, there would not have been an absolute need for the 
court to treat same-sex couples as their own class.  This is so be-
cause, as unmarried couples, same-sex couples may still have theo-
retically possessed the opportunity to marry, and thereby, to avail 
themselves of spousal benefits.  Even with the existence of the De-
fense of Marriage Act,116 the court could still have refused to assess 
disparate treatment between same-sex couples and opposite-sex 
couples by deciding to address the merit of the issue only at the 
point of a constitutional challenge against the Defense of Marriage 
Act. 
With marriage absolutely barred against same-sex couples as a 
consequence of the marriage amendment, however, the ineligibility 
of a domestic same-sex partner of an employee to become a 
“spouse” under the employee benefits program became a critical 
issue under equal protection clause analysis.  In this sense, the mar-
riage amendment, together with the equal protection clause and 
the benefits program’s spousal limitation, virtually forced the court 
to hear the case by categorizing the plaintiffs as same-sex couples.117 
Because of the way the marriage amendment actually assisted 
the plaintiffs in Carter by assuring them status as same-sex couples, 
rather than merely unmarried couples, Carter may offer a way for-
ward for other states with marriage amendments to reconcile de-
 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Act of May 7, 1996, ch. 21, 1996 Alaska Sess. Laws 1 (codified at ALASKA 
STAT. §§ 25.05.011(a), .013(a), .013(b) (2004)). 
 117. But see Clarkson, supra note 19, at 244–45 (predicting that the Amend-
ment would trump all claims brought by same-sex couple plaintiffs and that same-
sex couples would not be able to attain benefits reserved for married couples be-
cause courts would follow the distinction of married couple and unmarried couple 
and, consequently, find no suspect classification). 
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mocratically chosen marriage amendments118 with a real need for 
legal recognition and protection of same-sex couples.  Although 
the decision in Carter most likely fails to satisfy completely those 
who are most adamant about denying legal recognition to same-sex 
relationships and those who insist on nothing less than full mar-
riage equality for same-sex couples, for the time being at least, 
Carter provides a middle ground that permits states with marriage 
amendments to retain their amendments while simultaneously se-
curing important rights for same-sex couples, especially since the 
rationale in Carter is open for extension to all rights and privileges 
short of actual marriage. 
Applying the rationale of Carter in individual state legal envi-
ronments naturally would produce varying results, with some states 
being more protective of same-sex couples than others.  Besides 
different constitutional equal protection doctrines, states have 
widely varying statutes and regulations affecting homosexuals.119  
Despite the diverse legal patchwork that exists throughout the 
United States, Carter is a useful model for other states largely be-
cause it represents the first decision by a state supreme court to ex-
tend equal employment benefits to same-sex domestic partners of 
public employees in a state with a marriage amendment.  Addi-
tionally, taking into consideration that Alaska was the first state in 
the republic to ratify a marriage amendment and that a high per-
 
 118. The weight that should be given to state constitutional amendments in 
terms of assessing democratic mechanics in conflict with important, recognized 
individual rights has been given much discussion in the context of marriage 
amendments.  See, e.g., Teresa Stanton Collett, Restoring Democratic Self-
Governance Through the Federal Marriage Amendment, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 95 
(2004); Douglas S. Reed, Popular Constitutionalism: Toward a Theory of State 
Constitutional Meanings, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 871 (1999). 
 119. States that have an executive order or governor’s policy prohibiting dis-
crimination against public employees based on sexual orientation and gender 
identity are Kentucky (2003), Indiana (2004), and Pennsylvania (2003).  States 
that have an executive order, administrative order, or personnel regulation pro-
hibiting discrimination against public employees based on sexual orientation are 
Alaska (2002), Arizona (2003), Colorado (2002), Delaware (2001), Louisiana 
(2004), Michigan (2003), Montana (2000), and Virginia (2006).  States that have a 
law or policy that provides state employees with domestic partner benefits are 
California (1999), Connecticut (2000), Illinois (2004), Iowa (2003), New Jersey 
(2004), New Mexico (2003), New York (1995), Oregon (1995), Rhode Island 
(2001), Vermont (1994), and Washington (2001), as well as the District of Colum-
bia (2001).  See Human Rights Campaign, “Laws and Policies Affecting State 
Employees,” http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Your_Community&Tem-
plate=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=16306 (last visited 
Mar. 29, 2006). 
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centage of Alaskans approved of it,120 the court in Carter moved 
Alaska significantly along in recognizing and protecting limited yet 
significant rights for same-sex couples. 
An illustration of how Carter might provide guidance to other 
state courts in dealing with the struggle between a marriage 
amendment and equal protection of same-sex couples is the current 
debate in Oregon.  In 2004, Oregon added a marriage amendment 
to its constitution.121  The quick ratification of the amendment 
mooted litigation challenging state statutes that made no provision 
for same-sex marriages.122  In holding the litigation to be moot, the 
Oregon court did not address the issue of marriage benefits be-
cause the plaintiffs did not properly bring the issue before the 
court.123  Following the lead of the plaintiffs in Carter, same-sex 
couples may have reasonable opportunity to bring a case for mar-
riage benefits124 in light of Oregon’s relatively broad equal protec-
tion clause.125 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Alaska Supreme Court in Carter handed over a remark-
able decision in terms of its context, timing, and circumstances.  Al-
though the decision was not without some questionable lines of 
reasoning, the holding was able to carefully navigate between re-
spect for the state’s marriage amendment and recognition that 
same-sex couples are entitled to equal protection.  At a time when 
many states have, in the last couple of years, adopted marriage 
amendments, it is now more critical than ever for courts to be able 
to reconcile majoritarian democracy with equal protection for all 
individuals.  Significantly, Carter recognized the identity of same-
sex couples as such, rather than attempting to fit same-sex couples 
into an incidental characteristic or category.  This permitted the 
court to address the issues affecting same-sex relationships far 
more squarely, honestly, and respectfully than has been the norm.  
 
 120. See Clarkson, supra note 19, at 244. 
 121. OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5(a) (“It is the policy of Oregon, and its political 
subdivisions, that only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid 
or legally recognized as a marriage.”). 
 122. Li v. Oregon, 110 P.3d 91, 102 (Or. 2005). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Oregon already provides state employees with domestic partner benefits.  
See supra note 119. 
 125. “No law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens privi-
leges, or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all 
citizens.”  OR. CONST. art. I, § 20. 
04__LOBSINGER.DOC 6/5/2006  4:00 PM 
138 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [23:117 
Perhaps it is those features, more than anything else, which will 
help reunite our fractured and polarized society. 
 
